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discursive aspect of contemplation, and the contrast between intellectus and ratio. 9 Hence, with the exception of McGinn's brief discussion, we have to go back to Bernard Lonergan's articles (which originally appeared in the 1940s and which were republished in his book Verbum)-although they dealt mainly with understanding rather than with contemplation as such-and Josef Pieper's Happiness and Contemplation, originally published (in German) in 1958. In short, during the last sixty years the non-discursive nature of Aquinas's notion of contemplation has not received any major scholarly attention.
The distinction between ratio and intellectus had been discussed in Pierre Rousselot's book, 
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As is well-known, ratio covers a wide range of meanings in scholastic thought, such as concept, intention, definition, exemplar, idea, cause, proof, meaning, and ratio particularis or cogitative power. In what follows I will use it as denoting our capacity for, or act of discursive reasoning. In a general sense it is the act or capacity which distinguishes humans from separate intelligences (angels and God). 11 Aquinas uses ratio to refer to both the act of discursive reasoning 12 or to the faculty of human intelligence in general, which operates discursively, although not exclusively so. In both cases-as act or faculty-the discursive dimension is being contrasted with the intellective one. 13 In ST I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1, for instance, we read: "the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process 11 See for instance De Ver. q. 24, a. 3, ad1 12 As in ST II-II, q. 49, a. 5, ad3 13 See also De Ver. q. 24, a. 3, ad1: "Reason is sometimes taken broadly for any immaterial cognition; and in this sense reason is found in God (…). It is also taken properly, as meaning a power which knows with discourse (cum discursu). In this sense reason is not found in God or the angels, but only in men." Other key texts which emphasise the distinction between ratio and intellectus include: I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad4 (with a reference to Ps-Dionysius); II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad1 (Ps-Dionysius); De Ver. q. 5, a. 1, ad5 (with a reference to Boethius); q. 8, a. 15 (Ps-Dionysius); q. 15, a. 1 (Boethius and Ps-Dionysius); q. 24, a. 3 (no reference);
Expos. De Trin. q. 2, a. 2 (no reference); q. 6, a. 1 (Boethius); ST I, q. 58, a. 3 (no reference) and a. 4 (Ps.-Dionysius); I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1 (no reference); I, q. 79, a. 8 (Ps-Dionysius); I, q.
79, a. 8, ad2 (Boethius); II-II, q. 8, a. 1 obj. 2 (Ps-Dionysius); I, q. 83, a. 4 (no reference); II-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad1 (no reference); II-II, q. 180, a. 3 (Ps-Dionysius).
7 | P a g e of discursion from one thing to another."
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Intellectus and its cognates also cover a wide range of meanings. In De Ver. q. 17, a. 1
Aquinas writes that the term intellectus sometimes signifies the thing understood (res intellecta); sometimes, it signifies the intellective power itself (potentia intellectiva); sometimes a habit; and sometimes an act. In what follows I will focus mainly on three of these meanings, namely the faculty of understanding in general, the activity of human understanding, and the habit of intellectus. As a habitus it can refer to the intellectual virtue of understanding (which Aristotle refers to in his Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140b30); or it can refer to one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit mentioned in Is. 11.2-3-a topic I will be touching upon towards the end of this contribution.
As will become clearer, intellectus, as distinct from discursive ratio, refers to understanding in an immediate fashion, either as angels do who enjoy an intellective intuition through the intermediary of the innate intelligible species, or as humans do: in our case it refers to the moment of insightful understanding, which remains distinct from, but grounds and fulfils, the ratiocinative process; 15 and it is in this crowning act that contemplation comes to fruition. I.
The Three Operations of the Intellect and the Crowning Contemplative Act
In accordance with the third book of De Anima (III, 6; 430a26ff) and other loci in the Aristotelian corpus, Aquinas usually identifies only two operations of the intellect, i.e., the understanding of indivisibles, through which we apprehend the essence of a thing, and combining (affirmation) and distinguishing (negation) in judgement.
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The first operation consists in the understanding of indivisibles or the grasping the quiddity of things, and this occurs in a twofold sense. It can refer to perception of something at an inchoative level which, for Aquinas, involves the agent intellect. Here no falsity can occur. It is the outcome of a complex process, the details of which need not detain us here.
Simplifying matters we can summarise as follows: after receiving the sensible species a phantasm is generated, from which the agent intellect abstracts an intelligible species, which is transformed into a mental concept (e.g., "a fly"). 20 The first operation of the intellect can also refer, secondly, to grasping the essence of something after a process of reasoning, and this is the result of a laborious process, which is prone to error.
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The second act refers to composition and division of things that are understood. Aquinas calls this judgement (e.g., "Socrates is white.").
In the Prooemium to the Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, however, he mentions a third operation, which is proper to reasoning itself (as discursive-ratiocinative): "it is the act by which we proceed from one thing to another, so as to arrive at a knowledge of 'what a thing is,' regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision" (Et utrorumque est visio intellectualis).
35 R. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 329. Aquinas writes: "If our intellect could immediately perceive (videret) the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never 16 | P a g e of an inchoative grasp of things ("a fly") and the understanding of first principles (of which we have an immediate, intellective grasp), we need the operations of judgement and reasoning to acquire knowledge of things. In short, following Aristotle, Aquinas conceives the first two operations in intellective terms, although we need ratiocination to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to come to know an intelligible truth.
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It seems, however, that Aquinas associates contemplation in the strict sense primarily with the non-discursive, simple understanding which crowns the three operations: strictly speaking, contemplation does not extend to all intellective dimensions of the operations of the intellect, but only to the simple grasp of truth in which these operations come to fulfilment.
To substantiate this claim, two observations must be made. First, it should be noted that the three operations-namely the grasping of indivisibles, composition and division, and reasoning-are clearly ordered towards one another. In the "Introduction" to his Exposition of Aristotle's On Interpretation, Aquinas explains that the first operation is ordered to the second, and the second to the third. This third operation, reasoning, finds its term and fulfilment in intellective rest of understanding and simplex intuitus, which is the ultimate goal of our cognitive process. In short, the first operation-grasping the quiddity-is ordered understand by discursion and reasoning (discurrendo et ratiocinando). In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence." (ST I, q. 58, a. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed (finaliter perficitur), namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet is has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles (acceptatio principiorum), from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles (deductio principiorum), the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act (ultimus autem completivus actus) is the contemplation of the truth. 37 De Ver. q. 14, a. 9: When we attain this understanding or comprehension of things "the gaze of the intellect is fixed" (intuitus intellectus in eis figatur) on them, and we give assent to them "because of the witness of our own understanding."
38 See ST II-II, q.180, a. 6, ad2: "In contemplation discoursing must be laid aside (cessante discursu) and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth."
I take the acceptatio principiorum from which we proceed towards truth, and the deductio principiorum to refer to the two reasoning processes discussed earlier (cf. ST I, q. 79, a. 8),
namely, the via inventionis and the via iudicii. From the conclusion Aquinas draws it is clear that these two reasoning processes culminate, and come to fruition in, an intellective understanding, which is the acme and fulfilment of contemplation. Thus, while the two operations Aquinas usually identifies (grasping the quiddity, and composition and division)
are intellective in nature, contemplation is especially associated with the simple, nondiscursive understanding which crowns our reasoning processes. It is the moment of insight which follows upon, and crowns, the discursive reasoning process and which, in turn, makes further reasoning possible in a circular movement: "the discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what previously did not know." 39 It is this terminus of human reasoning which is the high-point of human understanding; it is this which mirrors the intellective operation of angels, as we will see; and it is this which pertains especially to contemplation. Having reiterated his etymological view that intellectus is derived from intus legere, penetrating into the essence of things, he goes on to say: "Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. 44 ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4. I follow the Leonine edition which has "quartum vero contemplativum" instead of "quartum vero et completivum" (as the Blackfriars' Edition has it).
22 | P a g e which seems to further strengthen the claim that he seems keen to distinguish the contemplative act from the other acts of the intellect. Furthermore, it is remarkable that Aquinas calls the acts of the intellect discussed in article 3 praeter contemplationem, that is, acts "other than" (Blackfriars) or "exclusive of" (Shapcote's translation) "contemplation."
This would further suggest that Aquinas wants to interpret the ultimate act of contemplation in terms distinct from, if not irreducible to, the other operations of the intellect.
While I grant that these arguments regarding the exact status of the final contemplative act in relation to the first two operations may not be entirely conclusive, it is nonetheless clear that ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3 supports the view that contemplative understanding must indeed be characterised as simple insight into the truth in which the other three operations come to fulfilment. Now I want to examine in some more detail the simplicity of this act, and how its intellectivity is distinct from the composite nature of our ratiocinative processes. This will bring us to my core argument, as to why I believe Aquinas's notion of contemplation is deeply indebted to Neoplatonic sources, and should not be interpreted solely in Aristotelian terms.
II.

Intellectus, Ratio and Aquinas's Neoplatonic Sources
When making the distinction between intellectus and ratio, which is central to his notion of contemplation as intuitus simplex, Aquinas invariably draws on the writings of Ps. 25 | P a g e intellectual method which he attributes to metaphysics or divine science. This requires him to distinguish between ratio and intellectus, and he does so as follows:
Now reason differs from intellect as multitude does from unity. Thus Boethius says that reasoning is related to understanding as time to eternity and as a circle to its centre. For it is distinctive of reason to disperse itself in the consideration of many things, and to gather one simple truth from them. Thus Dionysius says: 'Souls have the power of reasoning in that they approach the truth of things from various angles, and in this respect they are inferior to the angels; but inasmuch as they gather a multiplicity into unity they are equal to the angels.' Conversely, intellect first contemplates a truth one and undivided and in that truth comprehends a whole multitude, as God, by knowing his essence, knows all things. Thus Dionysius says:
'Angelic minds have the power of intellect in that they understand divine truths in a unified way.' It is clear, then, that rational thinking ends in intellectual thinking, following the process of analysis, in which reason gathers one simple truth from many things. And again, intellectual thinking is the beginning of rational thinking, following the process of synthesis, in which the intellect comprehends a multiplicity in unity.
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The quotation from Boethius is from De Consol. Phil. IV, prosa 6. The quotations from Ps- Gentiles II, 68.6 he again quotes from The Divine Names, writing that "divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with the beginning of the lower", and he encourages us "to contemplate the marvellous connection of things," in which "it is always found that the lowest in the higher genus touches the highest of the lower species." Hierarchy contributes to the diversity and beauty of the universe (Summa contra Gentiles III, 97.3). Brute animals do not have ratio but they have natural judgement; so too, we, although mainly rational, share ("in a slight participation") in the understanding which angels enjoy (De Ver. q. 15, a. 1).
58 In De Ver. q. 8, a. 15 Aquinas compares our simple insight into first principles (without discourse) to the natural knowledge of angels: "There necessarily are some things in our intellect which it knows naturally, namely, first principles-even though in us this knowledge is not caused unless we receive something through our senses. Therefore, the relation of our intellect to those principles is similar to that which an angel has to all that he knows naturally.
And since the knowledge we have of principles is the highest form of our knowledge, it is evident that on this summit of our nature we reach to some extent the lowest point of an angel's. For, as Dionysius says: 'The divine wisdom has linked the boundaries of the first creatures to the place where the second begin.' (De Div. Nom., VII.3) . Consequently, just as we know principles by simple intuition without discourse (sicut nos sine discursu principia cognoscimus simplici intuitu), so do the angels know all they know in the same fashion. This without any discourse or inquiry." 59 Our rationality is a kind of shadow 60 of the pure intellectivity of angels, which it mirrors, and in which it participates, 61 no matter how imperfectly.
At first sight the differences between human and angelic cognition appear considerable. The knowledge of angels is immutable (immobilis), for they directly see the pure truth by a simple intuition, without any discursive movement, beyond time. 62 Their act of understanding is is why they are called 'intellectual' (intellectuales), and why our habit of principles has the same name." 
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Aristotle in this context-for he gives us no indication. Moreover, an in-depth answer to this question would require an exhaustive comparison of Aristotle's and Aquinas's views on contemplation, scientia, intellectus and sapientia-an enterprise I cannot undertake within the confines of this paper. Still, we can hint at a possible answer.
Aristotle uses nous both in a general sense to include all operations of reason (e.g. 429a23),
and to refer to a non-discursive apprehension of first principles, as distinct from dianoia (discursive reasoning). When he uses it in a more restricted sense, such as in Posterior Analytics, nous (intellectus) refers to grasping first principles, which are necessary to generate the reasoning process in the first place, and avoid an infinite regress. Given the fact that Aristotle too acknowledges the non-discursive nature of nous, which simply accepts certain principles without argument or deduction, why then does Aquinas refer to Neoplatonic sources when discussing intellective contemplation?
Specifically in the context of contemplation a characteristic (and well-known) passage from
Nicomachean Ethics VI.6 (1140b31-1141a8) may suggest an answer. 66 Here Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues of nous (intellectus), episteme (scientia), and sophia (sapientia); the latter is the most excellent and characteristic virtue of the contemplative person. He explains that because episteme involves reason (meta logou) the insight into first principles is not a matter of episteme but of nous: "what is scientifically known is demonstrable" while first principles are not. Thus, the end-result of demonstrative reasoning is called episteme (scientia), and it always presupposes reasoning (meta logou): scientia is from conclusions, intellectus from principles. After having reiterated that "understanding and 66 While the main discussion of contemplation can be found in Bk X, for our purposes the discussion in Bk VI is more rewarding as this is where Aristotle explicitly deals with the intellectual virtues. Emphasising the intellective, simple, and non-discursive nature of human cognition has a number of advantages. First, as indicated earlier, it makes clear that to the degree that we, too, are intellective, we share in a hierarchy which puts us within touching distance of angels, who are entirely intellective. This matters to Aquinas for whom hierarchy adds to the beauty of the created world.
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More importantly, it further supports his view that there is continuity between our ways of knowing on earth, and the beatific vision. The intellective dimension of contemplation on earth prefigures our non-discursive ways of knowing God in the after-life. This kind of continuity mattered to Aquinas the theologian, for whom grace perfects nature but does not abolish it. Thus, the intellective nature of contemplation enables Aquinas to argue more cogently that contemplation on earth is an inchoative sharing in heavenly beatitude. 40 | P a g e clearly intuitive or non-discursive. 77 In my view it is here that the notions of simplicity and intuitus simplex are of particular significance: Aquinas is willing to defend notions of scientia, intellectus and sapientia that are utterly non-composite and non-discursive, especially when he discusses the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Given the fact that an exhaustive discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is beyond the confines of this paper, I will focus for present purposes exclusively on Aquinas's treatment of the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit in the latter parts of the Summa Theologiae. As is well- as it denotes 'vision.' The contemplative person, however, uses rational inquiry (inquisitione rationis) so as to attain the vision of contemplation, which is his main goal." operation (the apprehension of quiddity). It involves a certain perception of the truth, 78 "an excellence of cognition that penetrates into the heart of things" (excellentia cognitionis penetrantis ad intima).
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The first objection of ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1 is particularly relevant for our purposes: given the fact that humans know truth discursively (discursive), which we associate with ratio rather than knowing simply (simpliciter), which we usually connect with intellectus, we should speak of 'the gift of reason' (donum rationis) rather than 'the gift of understanding' (intellectus). In reply, Aquinas reiterates that our reasoning proceeds from, and ends in, understanding. We speak of the gift of understanding (rather than reason) because the gift of understanding is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regards to the things we know intuitively and primordially. Thus, the gift of understanding assists us in immediately perceiving the truth (perceptio veritatis), and piercing with the mind (mente penetrare) into the principles of faith.
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It should not strike us as particularly surprising that the gift of understanding is nondiscursive. After all, the same can be said about the intellectual virtue of understanding. More significant is how Aquinas characterises the gifts of knowledge and wisdom. The first objection in article 1 of question 9 of the Secunda Secundae-the article raises the question whether scientia is a gift-cites An. Post. I, 2 (71b18), where Aristotle writes that demonstration is a syllogism producing scientia. Whereas science is the result (effectum) of our natural reasoning efforts, the gift of knowledge surpasses our natural ability. In his reply, Aquinas, while acknowledging that human science is acquired by means of demonstration, 78 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 5 ad3
79 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1 ad3
argues that the gift of the Holy Spirit is a participated likeness in the divine way of knowing, which is non-discursive and simple:
In God there is a sure judgement of truth without any discursive process, by simple intuition (absque omni discursu per simplicem intuitum). Therefore, God's knowledge is not discursive, or ratiocinative, but absolute and simple (non est discursiva vel ratiocinativa, sed absoluta et simplex), to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, since it is a participated likeness thereof (participata simulitudo ipsius).
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In short, the non-discursive or intuitive nature of the gift of knowledge is one of the key features that distinguishes it from the intellectual virtue of scientia.
Following Augustine, Aquinas distinguishes between the gifts of knowledge and wisdom by linking the former with the cognition of things created, and the latter of things divine.
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Whereas the gift of knowledge pertains to judgements of created things, the gifts of understanding and wisdom, then, are particularly relevant for our contemplation of divine truth. 83 I have already outlined the non-discursive nature of the gift of intellectus. It is now time to examine the gift of sapientia. 
